Anticipating Allies’ Responses to U.S. Retrenchment: Lessons from Limited Military Withdrawals During the Cold War
发布日期
2025-07-08
摘要

During U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, his administration has been signaling the possibility of U.S. retrenchment from Europe (and possibly other regions) to promote allied burden-sharing. Evaluating whether such a change serves U.S. interests involves considering a variety of effects, including the behaviors of U.S. rivals, regional stability, and U.S. defense budgets. RAND researchers analyze one aspect of this broader calculation: how retrenchment affects the behavior of U.S. allies. To do so, they consider lessons from cases of U.S. retrenchment from West Germany, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s.

The United States has long viewed itself as a global security leader, so it has not entirely retrenched from key regions. Still, the United States has engaged in limited retrenchment, which means reducing (but not eliminating) U.S. military involvement in a country or region by withdrawing U.S. forces, downgrading U.S. commitments to allies or partners, or providing less military assistance. Contemporary proponents of limited retrenchment argue that it would incentivize U.S. allies to do more for their own defense, moderate their ambitions, and act in ways that promote regional stability. However, these arguments run counter to the central tenets of post–Cold War U.S. grand strategy. To evaluate these competing beliefs, RAND researchers assessed how these historical U.S. force drawdowns and accompanying policies affected the perceptions and behaviors of these four U.S. allies, including effects on nuclear proliferation.  

成果类型
Research
全文链接
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA739-8/RAND_RRA739-8.pdf
来源平台
主题
China
发现
Allies’ first responses were to attempt to prevent, limit, or shape U.S. retrenchment.Fears of U.S. abandonment led the most vulnerable ally to initiate a nuclear weapon program, but the United States was still able, with difficulty, to convince South Korea to stop its program.Allies did not shift alignment away from the United States or bandwagon with threatening powers.Allies doubled down on their relationship with the United States to preserve what they could of the U.S. commitment.Allies moderated their ambitions or policies toward their rivals.Effects on burden-sharing were uneven. Each ally’s level of vulnerability and economic conditions affected how much it invested in its own defense.Some allies sought to deepen ties with alternative partners, but differing threat perceptions and alignment preferences limited these relationships.Limited U.S. retrenchment did not have a consistent effect on allies’ purchases of U.S. military equipment.
建议
Policymakers considering retrenchment should develop a plan to manage allies’ opposition to retrenchment while still incorporating their input about implementation.Policymakers considering retrenchment should expect limited retrenchment’s effect on burden-sharing to be uneven.Policymakers considering retrenchment should decide how to weigh nonproliferation against burden-sharing goals.

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