At least since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a subset of realists, conservatives, and progressives have called for greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy. Given that restraint is a key position in the grand strategy debate, this article explores the variations within restraint's big tent in greater detail. Drawing on writings by and interviews with advocates of restraint, we identify the underlying beliefs that have led these disparate groups to converge on restraint. We find that there are competing visions of restraint. Realists want to prevent the emergence of regional hegemons without provoking great power war; conservatives seek to preserve what they identify as the American way of life; and progressives are motivated by the desire to combat inequality and injustice at home and abroad. Even within each group, there are a range of underlying beliefs and foreign policy preferences, and more divisions have emerged in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China's rise. We explore how these groups' positions may evolve in the future as the threat environment continues to change and new policy questions emerge.

Discussions about U.S. military posture in the Indo-Pacific often assume that the United States will have the ability to not only quickly access its military capabilities stationed in the region, but also to freely operate from bases in allied countries. The authors of this report explore this assumption, examining the opportunities and constraints that the U.S. military might face when operating from the territories of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Philippines. The authors examine the basing and access assumptions for the U.S. military should it wish to preposition supplies in, and operate from, these allies in peacetime and in a conflict over Taiwan when these allies themselves have not been attacked. For this research, the authors conducted a comprehensive literature review of historical and current studies on access; held an internal RAND workshop with military experts to determine the types of capabilities and access requests the United States might make of Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines in a Taiwan contingency; conducted extensive discussions and interviews in the fall of 2022 with officials and experts in Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines and with U.S. government personnel and experts in the United States who work on issues related to these three allies; and examined important agreements the United States has with each treaty ally that are relevant for U.S. military access and basing. The authors present their findings regarding access and basing for each ally and recommend ways to improve outcomes in both areas.