With China as the pacing challenge and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as the pacing scenario, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management as it considers its approach to prosecuting a hypothetical future conflict with China. As a result of China's secure second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability, the United States must now, more than ever, consider how to tailor its conventional military operations to avoid triggering Chinese nuclear first use. This report is part of a series exploring how the U.S. joint force could better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management in a Taiwan conflict scenario. In this report, the authors consider the potential thresholds and drivers of Chinese nuclear first use in a Taiwan conflict scenario in the context of China's evolving nuclear force posture and ongoing nuclear buildup. Their overarching finding is that, in the event of a fully committed military conflict with China over Taiwan, nuclear escalation will always be a plausible scenario in which no amount of U.S. effort could reduce the risk of escalation to zero. As China's nuclear posture continues to evolve, the United States is now dealing with a China that has a survivable second-strike capability. This suggests that the United States must actively account for how China might interpret and respond to U.S. conventional strikes when planning its operations and be adequately prepared for dealing with Chinese nuclear first use.

Rising tensions between Washington and Beijing, coupled with China’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal, have stoked anxieties about a possible military conflict between the two countries, especially over Taiwan. As the United States considers the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. military must be prepared for the risks of nuclear escalation inherent in great-power conflict. This report is one in a series of reports exploring how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force's bomber force, could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use. This report explores potential escalation pathways that involve U.S. conventional long-range strike and end with Chinese nuclear first use. The authors employ analytic strategic theory and historical case studies informed by operational analysis as part of a larger project with a mixed-methods approach. Building on the tradition of analytic strategic theory cultivated at RAND since the 1950s and examples from history, the authors draw on the operational analysis of joint long-range strike and their understanding of the Chinese nuclear first use drivers presented in Volumes 2 and 3 of this report series to develop an original framework to analyze prospective pathways to nuclear escalation in a U.S.-China conventional conflict and identify implications for U.S. joint long-range strike.

Although U.S.-China trade tensions have waxed and waned for decades, they have remained persistently high since 2017. In this report, the authors assess the effectiveness of more-restrictive U.S. economic policies adopted toward China and pursued between 2017 and 2024. These policies include those aimed at addressing the U.S. dependence on imports from China, preventing U.S. technologies from being transferred to China, and supporting investment and production in domestic industries that are deemed critical for U.S. national security and technological leadership. The authors identify two main goals of these recent policies: promoting fairer trade and defending U.S. economic interests. In their policy review, they find that U.S. economic policies achieved limited progress in promoting fairer trade but a higher degree of success in defending U.S. economic-related interests. Finally, the authors present several policy recommendations to better achieve these two goals related to trade, industry, controls on technology, economic diplomacy, foreign investment, and diversification of supply chains away from China.

People's Armed Police Forces Departments (PAFD), or People's militias, have grown under Xi Jinping. This reflects apprehension about domestic security rather than any serious effort at wartime preparedness. PAFD units are staffed by military and civilian employees from local governments. They are responsible for recruiting personnel for all the armed forces, as well as overseeing the recruitment, organizing, and management of militia forces. The Party aims to create a heightened sense of corporate responsibility toward the PRC's national development goals through efforts to build militia units within companies. PAFD also contributes to military modernization through training and recruitment efforts. Xi has also directed all elements of the armed forces, including the PAFD, to support the strengthening of the military-civil fusion development strategy.

Since the transition from Chinese leader Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in November 2012, the key principle underlying Beijing's policy toward Taiwan—that the island is not independent and is an immutable part of China which must ultimately be "reunified" with the mainland—has remained consistent. However, in the last eight years since the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen of the Taiwan-centric Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in May 2016, Beijing's rhetoric, policies, and actions toward the island have changed and ramped up considerably. Following the election in January 2024 of Tsai's vice president, Lai Ching-te (William Lai) who is also with the DPP, Xi's New Era will likely make the Taiwan Strait an increasingly tense and dangerous environment, with potentially significant consequences for U.S. policy and strategy both there and throughout the Indo-Pacific. Our paper seeks to accomplish five things. First, we provide a brief history of cross-Strait relations since Tsai's election in January 2016 to explain the present circumstances. Second, we describe and analyze Beijing’s evolving cross-Strait policy under Xi during this time by highlighting Chinese policy positions in key authoritative documents. Third, we attempt to predict the trajectory of China’s cross-Strait policy in the coming years, with particular emphasis on how Beijing might react to Lai's election. Fourth, we consider the potential implications for Taiwan and its partnership with the United States, and finally, we offer several concluding thoughts and policy recommendations derived from our analysis.