The authors of this report present a brief historical overview of the relationship between African countries and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its inception in the middle of the 20th century. In this overview, the authors cover economic, humanitarian, and political aspects; highlight trade and investment flows; and summarize Chinese medical and military aid to Africa. The authors also cover Chinese interests in Africa and African countries’ concerns about Chinese engagement on the continent. In addition, three country case studies are presented to highlight how Chinese engagement differs from country to country on the continent. The authors conclude with recommendations for policymakers and propose areas for further research. A decline in relations between the West and Africa at the end of the Cold War and the drop in Western approval because of undemocratic practices and human rights abuses in African countries have created an avenue for China to expand its relationships with African countries. While the West attached conditions to loans and assistance offered to African countries, China presented a no-strings-attached alternative, which only required African nations to respect China’s core sovereignty interests. China has also taken advantage of disinvestment by Western companies in Africa to increase its investments. Chinese economic engagement declined in the second half of the 2010s but is now enjoying a revitalization. This economic engagement has paved the way for greater political and security engagements with African countries.

In this report, the authors explore the equities of four middle powers — Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom — and the roles that they might play in deterring or limiting conflict between China and Taiwan over the Taiwan Strait. A country's equities are its long-term interests in a scenario, such as a cross-Strait conflict. Middle powers are nations that are not small but lack the sheer size and influence to significantly disrupt the global order. However, middle-power countries can influence international affairs through mediation and institution-building, and middle powers can also play a balancing role between adversarial great powers. The authors use four countries — Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom — to conduct a case-study analysis on how middle powers perceive China's interests and their own nations' interests in a cross-Strait conflict. The authors held discussions with analysts and policymakers from each middle-power nation on such topics as whether these nations would support Taiwan in a cross-Strait conflict, the threats that China might perceive from these nations, and whether the respondents think that China would initiate a conflict with Taiwan. The authors supplemented these discussions with an open-source literature review on how middle powers have been defined historically to support their analysis of each middle power's equities in a potential cross-Strait conflict. Finally, the authors offer several recommendations for future middle-power strategies that might be useful to policymakers in Taiwan, the United States, and middle powers with a stake in the Asia-Pacific region.

In this report, the authors explore possible future cooperation scenarios in which the Russian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army could operate together as coalition partners. The authors examine historical patterns of Russian and Chinese alliance behavior as well as current military-to-military engagements between these two militaries that include exercises, training events, such operational activities as joint maritime and air patrols, and high-level exchanges. Given these military engagement trends, three scenarios that illustrate how Russian and Chinese forces might operate together under different strategic and operational circumstances are then examined. These scenarios are then used to identify the prospects and pitfalls for future Russian and Chinese military cooperation in conflict and to explore implications for U.S. policymakers, commanders, and planners.