As ample wargaming and analysis have shown, any war with China would be economically and strategically costly, as well as fraught with the risk of escalation to nuclear war. In addition, any U.S.-China military conflict could very likely last longer than envisioned by traditional force planning scenarios, which often are designed around relatively limited objectives and call for U.S. forces and capabilities that could bring a war to a quick, decisive conclusion. This report describes a set of scenarios of such protracted conflicts and provides what could be a foundation for more-detailed planning or analysis. To allow free creative scope for the scenario development process, the authors did not place a priori constraints on the meaning of “protracted,” and therefore, the resulting scenarios feature a variety of circumstances in which the United States and China could be required to sustain military operations on much longer time frames.

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping's reported order to the Chinese military to be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027 and China's ongoing nuclear buildup have raised U.S. concerns over the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict. A conflict with China would be distinct from the wars the United States has fought in the post–Cold War period against regional powers without nuclear weapons. This report summarizes a series of reports on how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force's bomber force, could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use. This report is the product of a mixed-methods research approach that combined regional studies, analytic strategic theory, and historical case studies, all informed by operational analysis. The authors (1) conducted original Chinese-language research leveraging open-source Chinese military writings; (2) supplemented the limited information available from open-source Chinese military writings with historical case studies and a broad review of analytic strategic theory dating back to early RAND work in the 1950s, along with a literature review of Western scholarship on China; (3) reviewed publicly available U.S. Department of Defense documents and recent non-U.S. government wargames; and (4) developed an analytic framework that linked China’s nuclear escalation with specific technical or employment characteristics of U.S. joint long-range strike.

This report is the second volume of a four-volume study that examines the risk of a military conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan escalating to Chinese nuclear first use, particularly looking at how the United States' employment of conventional joint long-range strike capabilities could trigger or at least contribute to this escalation. The aim of this volume is to provide background and context for the broader study, focusing on U.S. conventional joint long-range strike capabilities and employment options. To address the question of the nuclear escalation risks of U.S. conventional long-range strike in a war with China, the authors considered it important to first assess what capabilities would be available to U.S. leadership and how they might be employed. This consideration stems from the underlying hypothesis that different long-range capabilities and different types of long-range strike campaigns and associated target sets will have varying impacts on escalation dynamics. There is no singular or definitive answer to how the United States would employ conventional long-range strike in a war with China; in this study, the authors instead map out the underpinning logics and contours of the issue.

Rising tensions between Washington and Beijing, coupled with China’s ongoing expansion of its nuclear arsenal, have stoked anxieties about a possible military conflict between the two countries, especially over Taiwan. As the United States considers the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. military must be prepared for the risks of nuclear escalation inherent in great-power conflict. This report is one in a series of reports exploring how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force's bomber force, could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use. This report explores potential escalation pathways that involve U.S. conventional long-range strike and end with Chinese nuclear first use. The authors employ analytic strategic theory and historical case studies informed by operational analysis as part of a larger project with a mixed-methods approach. Building on the tradition of analytic strategic theory cultivated at RAND since the 1950s and examples from history, the authors draw on the operational analysis of joint long-range strike and their understanding of the Chinese nuclear first use drivers presented in Volumes 2 and 3 of this report series to develop an original framework to analyze prospective pathways to nuclear escalation in a U.S.-China conventional conflict and identify implications for U.S. joint long-range strike.

The discovery that the People's Republic of China is expanding its nuclear arsenal, Russia's "suspension" of the New START arms control treaty and aggression in Ukraine, and North Korea's evolving nuclear capabilities have led some to argue that the United States needs to expand its own nuclear forces to deter these potential adversaries. This Perspective articulates a framework for determining "how much is enough" for U.S. nuclear forces in the emerging strategic environment. The author argues that adversary perceptions, rather than quantitative comparisons, should be the primary criteria for sizing U.S. nuclear forces.