The United States is engaged in a strategic competition with China over the nature of the global system, and the Middle East has emerged as a central site of great power competition: The United States, China, and Russia are all active there. At the heart of this competition is technology. Middle Eastern countries have been developing strong technology links with China while maintaining their security and economic relations with the United States. Smart cities present a valuable case study of this competition. A smart city is a city that addresses public issues with solutions based on information and communication technology–enabled use of large-scale data available from the Internet of Things. China is involved in dozens of smart city projects in the Middle East. In that region, the need for improved urban environments is pressing. The region is well above the world average for percentage of population living in urban areas and for urban population growth. Smart city infrastructure can be used to improve services, but it can also be used for population control, to limit public dissent, to violate privacy, and to strengthen authoritarian tendencies. This therefore makes smart cities a positive factor in improved services and greater connectivity but also a potential threat to civil society and personal and political freedom. China’s involvement raises an additional issue: that of data security and the integrity of communications networks, especially those related to U.S. activities in the region. This paper addresses potential U.S. concerns related to these developments.

U.S.-China competition, including economic competition, has come to define U.S. foreign policy since 2017. The two economies are the first- and second-largest national economies in the world and are deeply intertwined. Changes to the relationship, however necessary, could be costly. The United States thus faces a challenge ensuring that its economy meets the nation's needs under conditions of coupled, strategic competition. To respond to this challenge, RAND researchers conducted economic and institutional analyses of U.S.-China competition, engaged in a participatory foresight exercise to understand the long-term path for ensuring U.S. economic health, and created two economic competition games exploring the dynamics of multiple countries trying to ensure their economic health while interacting with each other and the private sector. This report, the first of a four-part series, includes the economic and institutional analyses of U.S.-China economic competition. Individual chapters cover the Chinese concept of economic security; a stock-taking of China-related measures by the United States; an analysis measuring how intertwined supply chains are and options for disentangling them; a theoretical account of the effectiveness of cooperative versus restrictive modes of engaging with China and Chinese officials; and examinations of specific aspects of U.S.-China competition, including return migration of Chinese nationals from the United States to China, energy and environmental security, how Chinese privately owned enterprises might differ from Western private enterprises and implications for policy, and potential ways by which to update the rules of international trade to adapt to China's unique system of economic management.

In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping endorsed a new initiative, known as the Global Energy Interconnection (GEI), that could help solve humanity's pressing energy and climate dilemmas through the development of a global power grid. The GEI would connect remote renewable sources of energy to global consumption centers using ultra-high-voltage power transmission lines spanning continents and smart technologies. This way, peak demand for electricity in the evening in eastern China, for example, could be met using solar power at noon in central Asia, matching supply and demand across countries and continents more efficiently. On paper, the proposal presents many benefits. However, concerns about China's intentions and the political, security, and economic implications of a China-led GEI also exist. The GEI is reminiscent of China's similar controversial initiatives to connect with the rest of the world in such sectors as telecommunications, port infrastructure, and rail. In this report, RAND researchers set out to advance knowledge on the GEI and to demystify the potential global security implications associated with this important but poorly understood initiative.

Climate change is projected to affect the physical environment of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) significantly throughout the 21st century and could have consequences for security. How climate change might do this, and what these security consequences might be, are important issues for security planners. U.S. competitors and adversaries could have new opportunities to seek advantages relative to the United States. To understand how China, Russia, and Iran might exploit climate-related conflicts, the RAND Corporation hosted a two-day workshop that presented nine scenarios with different climate hazards and levels of conflict to a panel of 11 subject-matter experts. The experts were knowledgeable about the overall global strategy, interests, and capabilities of China, Russia, and Iran and were asked to assess how these countries would react to climate-related conflict. This report provides the results of that workshop. The purpose of this research is to support CENTCOM leadership and planners and their interagency partners to prepare for a future security environment that is affected by climate change. Understanding the frequency of future conflict in the AOR, as well as the evolution of threats under climate change, will enable the U.S. government to better prepare for this future. This report is the fourth in a series focused on climate change and the security environment.

Over the past decade, China has upended the world of development assistance, rapidly becoming the world's largest bilateral lender by channeling large sums of money into the developing world. As China's economic engagement in the developing world has grown, so too have U.S. and allied concerns that China is leveraging development assistance to assert Chinese influence, weaken the United States' relative position, and achieve Beijing's broader national security interests. In this report, the authors conduct a net assessment of U.S. and Chinese development assistance and cooperation. The authors describe each country's differing approaches to economic engagement with developing countries and conduct a data-driven comparison to identify strategic asymmetries that might present opportunities for the United States to better compete with China for relationships and influence in the developing world. The assessment reveals that Chinese economic engagement in the developing world should not be conceptualized as aid or assistance; this mischaracterization has potentially led to an overreliance on U.S. development tools as a primary response. Moreover, despite evidence of the short-term benefits that China might gain from its development financing, it is not clear whether these benefits are sustainable or effective over the long term when compared with the U.S. approach. Nevertheless, China's efforts — its heavy emphasis on energy and infrastructure projects, its approach to working through elite actors in developing countries, and its willing embrace of greater risk and reduced transparency — create challenges and opportunities for the United States as it looks to compete with China in the developing world.