Climate models project that the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) may soon become ice-free in summer for a limited window of time, opening a seasonally navigable route that connects Asia to Europe by crossing over the North Pole. This Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) and its surrounding waters in the CAO have seen little activity and would be available for seasonal commercial and surface military activity, particularly from the surrounding exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Canada, Denmark (through Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, Russia, and the United States. In this report, the authors explore how global actors may leverage new maritime access in the CAO for economic, political, and military gain. Drawing on insights from climate models, literature, and expert interviews, they examine current and potential future maritime uses of the ocean and the TSR by Arctic states and other actors. They then present a scenario in four phases of how these activities could plausibly develop in the CAO over time. The authors find that the most plausible scenario for maritime use of the CAO in the next 25 years is one of limited activity, though numerous factors could lead to expanded commercial and military presence by global actors.

How might China's scientific, information, and commercial activities in the Arctic contribute to the country's broader security goals by enabling the collection of intelligence, allowing access to critical infrastructure, or providing other types of military advantages? China's activities in the Arctic have increased, and China's overall approach to strategic competition, which fuses the public with the private and the civilian sphere with the military, has heightened U.S. concerns that China might be on its way to becoming a security and military actor in the Arctic and that Russia is enabling this pathway. In this report, the authors present an analysis of China's economic, scientific, and information activities in the Arctic and call special attention to the intelligence collection and military risks that they might present, including the threat signals for these risks. The authors explore five categories of activities: natural resource exploitation, knowledge development, access to infrastructure, data transmission, and public diplomacy.

To what extent might China and Russia form partnerships in the Arctic region, and what factors might limit the development of their relationship? Although the United States has had Russia as a maritime neighbor in the Arctic since 1867, the growing presence of China in the region as a Russian partner has led to a rare situation in which two competitive — and potentially hostile — states are in very close proximity to North America. In this paper, the authors evaluate Russia's and China's activities in the Arctic and these activities' implications for nations with Arctic interests. The authors consider China's decades-long interest in the Arctic, its growing and possible future economic activities, and the existing and proposed collaborations that Beijing has sought with Arctic countries to realize its goals. The authors propose four scenarios for Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic that represent possible directions for evolution by 2035. Key factors that will shift this evolution in one direction or another include economic and broader geopolitical factors. The authors ultimately conclude that China's attention to the Arctic — in the context of its vastly broader economic security plans — rests on continued regional stability and that whether China engages with other Western Arctic countries may ultimately determine what the real limits are for a Sino-Russian friendship in the Arctic. Western policies that focus on differences between Russia and China may ultimately be more successful in shaping the Arctic's future than those that emphasize their similarities or friendly interactions thus far.