Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective

Van de Vijver, A (通讯作者),Univ Antwerp, Law Fac, Venusstr 23, B-2000 Antwerp, Belgium.
2022-11
Multinationals' aggressive tax lobbying that involves free-riding behaviour and results in disproportional benefits to the disadvantage of other taxpayers, is problematic for several reasons. Such lobbying undermines the legitimacy of tax legislation and has a negative impact on trust in the tax system. Based on Immanuel Kant's ethical theory, this article first suggests a new normative basis for a moral duty that requires multinationals and their leaders to be transparent about their political activities and tax lobbying. Next, it introduces a new concept of transparency in respect of tax lobbying. 'Deliberative transparency' requires multinationals and their leaders not only to be open about their reasons for tax lobbying, but also to deliberate with stakeholders and, maybe even more importantly, to provide evidence supporting their lobbying positions. Finally, based on these new understandings, additional government interventions against aggressive tax lobbying are suggested, for example mandatory stakeholder consultation, reporting on stakeholder attitudes and perception, and evidence-based lobbying requirements.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS
卷号:181|期号:1|页码:57-68
ISSN:0167-4544|收录类别:SSCI
语种
英语
来源机构
University of Antwerp
被引频次(WOS)
0
被引频次(其他)
0
180天使用计数
4
2013以来使用计数
15
EISSN
1573-0697
出版年
2022-11
DOI
10.1007/s10551-021-04911-3
学科领域
循证经济学
关键词
Ethics Kant Multinationals Stakeholders Lobbying Corporate tax Tax incentives
WOS学科分类
Business Ethics