The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have committed significant efforts to studying the Russia-Ukraine war and drawing lessons for Chinese policy. What lessons are CCP leaders taking from the Russia-Ukraine war and how do these lessons influence China’s future policies? The authors assessed CCP and PLA views of the war’s drivers and outcomes to understand the adaptations that China will likely make for its own competition with the United States. By understanding China’s perspective on and adaptations resulting from the war, U.S. policymakers can better inform decisions related to force development, posture, and employment. Research findings collectively suggest that China has increasing opportunities to take advantage of the Russia-Ukraine war to prepare for a future conflict of its own, but its opportunities to avoid such a conflict altogether are diminishing. Party leaders assess that this degraded security environment grants China new strategic opportunities to shape global narratives and security architectures. As a result, the PLA is transitioning to a new vision of warfare that relies less on compelling enemies to surrender with minimal employment of military force and is more resigned to fighting a costly, protracted conflict.

This chapter examines efforts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to transition its national defense mobilization system (NDMS) from a vehicle for emergency response and economic subsidization to a war-oriented system. Main Argument PRC leaders have twice reoriented the NDMS toward different strategic ends. The system initially embodied the "people's war," leveraging resources across the whole of Chinese society to enable military operations. In the mid to late 2000s, its priorities shifted toward economic development through subsidization and domestic emergency response. Yet the preponderance of these efforts had limited value for wartime mobilization. In 2015 the PRC initiated a series of reforms to prioritize war mobilization capabilities. Key among these reforms is the assumption by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of control over PRC government mobilization planning and support for the military. Reforms further standardized mobilization structures at all levels of government, potentially streamlining mobilization coordination between the government and military. While actual capability improvements remain to be seen, these reforms could effectively free the military from many traditional mobilization responsibilities to enable greater focus on war preparedness. Policy Implications NDRC leadership is likely to encounter significant challenges in posturing China's resources to support PLA requirements for large-scale combat operations, given the competing requirements to recover and develop the nation's economy. The PRC could seek to portray its NDMS as comprehensive, efficient, and effectively oriented to support wartime operations—regardless of the system's true readiness—as a deterrent against the U.S. PLA leaders' requirement that the system become war-oriented suggests that mobilization activities will be a key indicator of Chinese Communist Party leaders' intent or willingness to fight a costly war.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs a system of coded speech to communicate policy directives to its implementing bureaucracy. This coded speech is governed by rules and exists in a specific cultural context, potentially confounding those unfamiliar with that context. CCP leaders deploy these codes through the party propaganda system to issue policy directives, and the codes take the form of slogans, linguistic formulations, or key phrases, collectively called tifa. In this report, the author analyzes tifa by providing an overview of the role and relative authority of the information systems the CCP uses to develop, build consensus around, and promulgate tifa. He also identifies four essential characteristics of tifa. The author concludes that, although tifa analysis has specific limitations, it can produce authoritative determinations of what the CCP tells itself it is doing and why and could yield valuable insights into CCP leader perceptions.

Proliferated constellations in low earth orbit (LEO) have demonstrated significant battlefield utility in the Russia-Ukraine war and are likely to continue serving as an important component of space power in wartime. How Chinese leaders view these continued developments will have important implications for managing military escalation in space. The authors draw on open-source literature across the Chinese defense enterprise to assess People's Liberation Army (PLA) perspectives of LEO as a warfighting domain and the systems being deployed in LEO. The authors highlight Starlink as an influential development shaping Chinese views of LEO to contextualize their findings.

Recent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda is unsparing in its criticisms of US security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and of Japan's critical role as a US ally. According to a People's Daily column authored by Zhong Sheng (钟声), a pen name indicating authoritative party viewpoints, Japan is "obsessed with acting as a strategic vassal of the United States and instigating bloc confrontation", a reference to geopolitical tensions between the Cold War's eastern and western groupings. Writers in official CCP media seem to believe Japan is a key driver of "bloc confrontation" in the Indo-Pacific, labeling Japanese diplomatic leadership at the 2023 G7 summit in Hiroshima and Japan's engagement with the "Global South" as major contributions to confrontation. Japanese defense policy gets similar treatment from CCP propagandists. A researcher with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science (AMS), the PLA's top research institute reporting directly to the Central Military Commission, labels Japan's arms exports as proof that the country is "serving the strategic needs of the United States, wantonly provoking regional conflicts and becoming a 'troublemaker' in regional security".

How does the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) political legitimacy affect the People's Liberation Army (PLA)? In this report, the authors explore how the nature of the CCP's political legitimacy profoundly shapes the military's development and performance. Through a case study analysis, the authors outline three types of political legitimacy in China: (1) "revolutionary charisma" under leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping from 1949 to 1979; (2) "economic prosperity" under leaders Deng, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao from 1979 to 2002; and (3) "national populism" under leaders Hu and Xi Jinping since 2002. The authors find that each of these legitimacy types helped both drive and constrain the PLA's modernization and behavior in distinct ways. Moreover, each type of legitimacy experienced periods of strength and weakness. Through an alternative scenario analysis, the authors also explore how the CCP's evolution could change in coming years and what this could mean for the Chinese military’s development and for the U.S. Department of Defense.

One recent hot topic amid the U.S. Department of Defense's shift to focusing on "China, China, China" has been China's embrace of overseas military basing. This has been made more stark by the DoD revealing that China has been interested in establishing a base in at least 18 different countries, though so far Beijing has actually scored only moderate success in establishing a permanent presence in Djibouti, and now likely Cambodia. A common refrain has been concerns about the threat to the United States, ambiguously defined, though this seems geared, at least in part, to justify otherwise non-essential missions, force structure, and capabilities for parts of the department that feel left behind in the focus on China. We argue, instead, that the United States should consider Chinese overseas basing a competition phase challenge over international influence, because Beijing appears to have neither the intent nor capability through at least 2030 to conduct kinetic offensive operations against the United States. Our judgment is based on an extensive review of Chinese military open source writings, which found that People's Liberation Army (PLA) researchers are acutely aware of the vulnerabilities of overseas basing, which stop them from being combat-credible in the way that U.S. overseas basing is. PLA researchers focus much more on leveraging overseas basing for competition phase missions, such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) and sea lane patrols. The one potential driver we could identify that may lead the Chinese leadership to order its overseas forces to strike U.S. forces is if the United States implements a distant blockade of China during a future conflict – which further calls into question the utility of such an idea. This revised framing could help right-size the U.S. response to China's basing ambitions amid other higher priorities, and there are indicators the DoD can monitor to help hedge the risk of changing Chinese intent and growing capabilities into the future.

Chinese leaders see themselves in competition with the United States to build military power in space. The ongoing development of U.S. and Chinese capabilities could lead to unstable competition in space, raising the risk of rapid, and perhaps unintended, military escalation. This report surveys open-source literature across the Chinese defense enterprise to present a composite image of People's Liberation Army (PLA) perspectives and key factors for U.S.-China crisis stability in space. It draws on authoritative materials, including leader speeches reported in official media, defense white papers, and official professional military education, which collectively reflect political leader guidance and PLA strategy and doctrine. The findings suggest that the PLA's thinking on escalation dynamics in space has become significantly more risk-tolerant than that found in PLA documents published just a decade prior. This shift emphasizes Xi Jinping's guidance to be more proactive in shaping the international environment, which includes accepting higher but carefully calibrated levels of risk even though such proactive measures might result in unintended escalation with the United States. This higher escalation tolerance is complicated by Chinese leaders' inflated threat perceptions of the United States and resultant policy approach that resists cooperating with the United States to arrest unintended crisis escalation.

The People's Republic of China is brokering international access agreements to expand its security footprint overseas and extend the reach of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). While these bases' utility in peacetime is clear, their utility in wartime is less so. The authors of this report explore China's military strategy for its overseas bases—specifically, how Chinese military researchers view the utility of overseas bases during a war—based on a review of open-source Chinese military writings. The authors then address the risks that these bases might pose to U.S. military interests through 2030. Chinese military writings suggest that the PLA has neither the intent nor the capability to use overseas military bases to launch preemptive attacks or other offensive operations on U.S. forces or interests through at least 2030. While Chinese overseas military basing remains important to monitor, the authors' research shows that Chinese bases overseas are unlikely to become threats to U.S. interests and forces during this time frame. The authors also note that any PLA shift toward conducting offensive operations from its overseas bases may be accompanied by specific indications and warnings that the U.S. government can monitor.

Improvements in Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities could endanger the space-based capabilities that the United States relies on for a broad array of military and economic functions. The proliferation of U.S. and adversary capabilities could lead to unstable competition in space, raising the risk of unintended military escalation. In this report, the authors examine the conventional wisdom on escalation in the space domain to offer recommendations for how the U.S. Space Force (USSF) and other stakeholders can better prepare to deter and manage escalation. They investigate the implications of six propositions related to stability: (1) the incentives to employ offensive capabilities early in a conflict, (2) the benefits of leveraging foreign and commercial systems, (3) the utility of communications channels for crisis prevention and de-escalation, (4) the feasibility of promoting shared norms of responsible behavior, (5) the strategic benefits of selective revelation, and (6) the use of reversible capabilities to manage escalation.