China is experiencing rapid demographic change as young people are making up an ever-smaller share of the population. At the same time, China is seeking to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These two topics generally have been considered separately to date. In this report, the authors place China's current population dynamics in context to consider how demographic changes will affect the PLA and China's broader society and to improve understanding of China's military strategy and of the choices China will likely face in the near term. First, the authors discuss China's current and past fertility rates, comparing trends in China with those in other countries. Next, they document China's age distribution and compare it with that of the United States. They discuss other specific health- and education-related trends that will influence PLA recruiting, present information about China's past and its likely future economic growth rates, and analyze the implications for the PLA and the country as a whole. Finally, the authors discuss the PLA's aims and the ways in which demographic and other trends may influence its capacity to achieve its goals. The authors' analysis reveals that China's demographic trends do not portend a crisis for the PLA. However, China's economic and social environment will likely limit the PLA's ability to build the type of military that Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping envisions. If the PLA cannot access the types of recruits it needs, it may be forced to rethink its goals and assumptions about modernization.

A substantial divide has developed between the United States and China since 2017, largely driven by both nations' fundamentally different, and perhaps irreconcilable, objectives and priorities. While conflict is possible, it is also unlikely, as leaders in both countries desperately want to avoid war. The more likely future for US-China relations is one involving heightened economic and technological competition, ongoing regional tension as China continues to coerce its neighbours, and increasing pessimism in both Washington and Beijing about their ability to deter and counter each other. In this environment, meaningful cooperation and improved relations will be improbable.

In this report, the authors explore possible future cooperation scenarios in which the Russian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army could operate together as coalition partners. The authors examine historical patterns of Russian and Chinese alliance behavior as well as current military-to-military engagements between these two militaries that include exercises, training events, such operational activities as joint maritime and air patrols, and high-level exchanges. Given these military engagement trends, three scenarios that illustrate how Russian and Chinese forces might operate together under different strategic and operational circumstances are then examined. These scenarios are then used to identify the prospects and pitfalls for future Russian and Chinese military cooperation in conflict and to explore implications for U.S. policymakers, commanders, and planners.

For more than 30 years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has placed substantial emphasis on jointness. Whether in bolstering the relative influence of such joint organizations as combatant commands, requiring joint service for senior-level promotions, or achieving cross-service interoperability between operational units, jointness is valued conceptually from the strategic to the tactical levels. However, in practice, the value of jointness remains unmeasured and ill-defined, particularly as it relates to strategic competition. Many questions remain about the true utility of jointness to DoD goals, potential negative ramifications of jointness as it was implemented following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), and how the pursuit of jointness affects DoD's ability to innovate and adapt to future challenges. Moreover, it is not currently understood how jointness affects competitive advantage relative to the United States' primary adversaries. This study seeks to examine whether the assumption that jointness is inherently valuable is correct, and if so, in what ways. Understanding what aspects of jointness are most valuable and why can help DoD compete more effectively against its adversaries and maximize the United States' competitive military advantages.

The U.S. and Chinese militaries have been shaped by a distinct set of direct and indirect experiences. The U.S. military has focused its energy and resources on combating terrorism and performing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even in 2023, U.S. emphasis on major power competition contends with other national security priorities, including current crises and continued deployments around the globe. The People's Liberation Army (PLA), on the other hand, has largely focused its military modernization and restructuring to prepare for a regional conflict that would likely involve U.S. military intervention. Despite having no combat experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, the PLA has conducted an in-depth study of all aspects of the U.S. military's technological and operational capabilities — including its organization, command and control, logistics, joint operations, and concepts of operation — since the 1990s. The dichotomy presented by the experiences of both militaries raises several questions about how they are preparing for the possibility of a major power conflict. Since 2001, the U.S. military has gained significant direct combat experience, but has done so against technologically inferior, nonpeer adversaries. In contrast, the PLA had no direct combat experience. Even though its concepts of operation are designed to fight a major power, these concepts are largely derived from indirect observations and lessons from U.S. operations since 1991. The ways that each side gains and processes experience and incorporates it into training will heavily affect readiness for and performance in a future war.