僵尸网络是感染了恶意软件的计算机网络，攻击者控制并利用它来实现恶意网络活动。决策者可以结合复杂的自适应系统视角来评估他们的组织和直接网络以及整个生态系统是否具有足够的适应性和弹性来响应僵尸网络活动。
Bank runs as a source of systemic risk are nothing new. To manage systemic risks in the age of social media, regulators may need to anticipate where the crisis will go and build in automatic brakes to slow them down. There likely won't be time to react at the speed of negotiation between regulators and bankers.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operates multiple hazard mitigation assistance (HMA) grant programs as a way to promote a national culture of preparedness and public safety, mitigate the consequences that disasters have for communities and infrastructure, and reduce future draws on the Disaster Relief Fund. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act requires FEMA to ensure that these mitigation activities are cost-effective. To determine cost-effectiveness, FEMA currently requires any project seeking HMA grants to include a benefit–cost analysis (BCA), implemented in accordance with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94. Applicants for mitigation grants have provided extensive feedback that the BCA process is cumbersome and that finding the right data to include in the calculations of costs and benefits is difficult. FEMA is concerned that the administrative burdens and the costs of application processes could discourage subapplicants with fewer resources from applying or place them at a disadvantage in developing quality applications. Furthermore, two 2021 executive orders direct federal agencies to achieve greater equity and fairness in allocating federal resources. Two HMA grant programs have been selected as pilot programs for the corresponding federalwide Justice40 Initiative. The authors found that FEMA's dual goals of equity and simplicity occasionally compete, that FEMA has the authority to implement recommended changes, and that FEMA's approach to BCA differs from those of other federal entities. The authors identify nine changes that FEMA could implement to address the inequities introduced by the use of BCA in the HMA grant process.
Millions of Americans woke up Wednesday morning to find out they weren't going anywhere. Around 6:30 a.m., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced that its Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system had failed. By 9 a.m. the ground stop was lifted, but the damage was already done. Thousands of flights were It appears that the NOTAM outage was the result of a system failure, but the nation's critical infrastructure faces a range of threats—everything from Russian hackers, to weather events, to angry individuals with guns. So, the failure and subsequent air travel chaos brought on by this latest cyber failure could serve as a real-life demonstration of what might happen if risks to critical infrastructure systems are left unaddressed. It is too early to know the exact causes and consequences of the NOTAM failure, but two things are clear: It was bad, and it could have been worse.
如果太空大国之间没有进一步的合作和协议，最终可能会建立多种相互竞争的治理体系，从而进一步增加冲突的可能性。现在是解决这个问题的时候了，这样深空资源的利用就有助于地球和整个太阳系的繁荣、安全和自由。
Future quantum computing capabilities are expected to be able to break the security of current implementations of public-key cryptography. Public-key cryptography forms the foundational building block of security for national information and communication infrastructure. Quantum computers will therefore create vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, although migrating to new post-quantum cryptography standards being developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology should mitigate vulnerabilities. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security asked the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center to perform high-level assessments of quantum vulnerabilities in the 55 national critical functions (NCFs) identified by the department. Researchers evaluated the significant issues affecting each NCF, then rated each NCF in the categories of urgency, scope, cost per organization, and other mitigating or exacerbating factors. The researchers then combined these ratings to create an assessment of each NCF's priority for assistance. They rated six of the NCFs as high priority for assistance, 15 as medium priority, and 34 as low priority. In addition, the team identified three NCFs as critical enablers of the transition to the new cryptographic standard. Finally, the researchers identified four key findings: (1) All NCFs need to prepare for the transition, (2) a significant portion of the vulnerability can be addressed with relatively few actions by the critical enablers, (3) catch-and-exploit vulnerabilities are urgent for only a few stakeholders, and (4) many factors related to the cryptographic transition are still uncertain and in need of more-detailed assessment.
